Informed consent for functional MRI research on comatose patients following severe brain injury: Balancing the social benefits of research against patient autonomy by Bruni, Tommaso et al.
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
BrainsCAN Publications BrainsCAN 
5-1-2019 
Informed consent for functional MRI research on comatose 
patients following severe brain injury: Balancing the social 
benefits of research against patient autonomy 
Tommaso Bruni 
Universitäts-Klinikum Bonn und Medizinische Fakultät 
Mackenzie Graham 
University of Oxford 
Loretta Norton 
Western University 
Teneille Gofton 
Western University 
Adrian M. Owen 
Western University 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/brainscanpub 
Citation of this paper: 
Bruni, Tommaso; Graham, Mackenzie; Norton, Loretta; Gofton, Teneille; Owen, Adrian M.; and Weijer, 
Charles, "Informed consent for functional MRI research on comatose patients following severe brain 
injury: Balancing the social benefits of research against patient autonomy" (2019). BrainsCAN 
Publications. 10. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/brainscanpub/10 
Authors 
Tommaso Bruni, Mackenzie Graham, Loretta Norton, Teneille Gofton, Adrian M. Owen, and Charles Weijer 
This article is available at Scholarship@Western: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/brainscanpub/10 
Bruni T, et al. J Med Ethics 2019;45:299–303. doi:10.1136/medethics-2018-104867     299
Informed consent for functional MRI research on 
comatose patients following severe brain injury: 
balancing the social benefits of research against 
patient autonomy
Tommaso Bruni,   1 Mackenzie Graham,2 Loretta Norton,3,4 Teneille Gofton,4 
Adrian M Owen,3,5 Charles Weijer3,5
Original research
To cite: Bruni T, Graham M, 
Norton L, et al. J Med Ethics 
2019;45:299–303.
1Medizinhistorisches Institut, 
Universitätsklinikum Bonn, 
Bonn, Germany
2Oxford Uehiro Centre for 
Practical Ethics, University of 
Oxford, Oxford, UK
3Brain and Mind Institute, 
Western University, London, 
Ontario, Canada
4Department of Clinical 
Neurological Sciences, Western 
University, London, Ontario, 
Canada
5Rotman Institute of Philosophy, 
Western University, London, 
Ontario, Canada
Correspondence to
Dr Tommaso Bruni, 
Medizinhistorisches Institut, 
Universitätsklinikum Bonn, 
Bonn, 53127, Germany;  
 tombruni@ uni- bonn. de
Received 21 March 2018
Revised 1 December 2018
Accepted 12 December 2018
Published Online First 
25 February 2019
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2019. Re-use 
permitted under CC BY-NC. No 
commercial re-use. See rights 
and permissions. Published 
by BMJ.
AbsTrACT
Functional MRI shows promise as a candidate 
prognostication method in acutely comatose patients 
following severe brain injury. However, further research 
is needed before this technique becomes appropriate for 
clinical practice. Drawing on a clinical case, we investigate 
the process of obtaining informed consent for this kind of 
research and identify four ethical issues. After describing 
each issue, we propose potential solutions which would 
make a patient’s participation in research compatible 
with her rights and interests. First, we defend the need 
for traditional proxy consent against two alternative 
approaches. Second, we examine the impact of the intensive 
care unit environment on the informed consent process. 
Third, we discuss the therapeutic misconception and its 
potential influence on informed consent. Finally, we deal 
with issues of timing in recruiting participants and related 
factors which may affect the risks of participation.
CAse
Kathy (this is a representative composite case 
that does not reflect any single patient) was a 
67-year-old woman who suffered an out-of-hospital 
cardiac arrest. She received 5 min of cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation and defibrillation by emergency 
medical services at the scene before the return of 
spontaneous circulation. In the hospital, she was 
diagnosed with an ST-elevation myocardial infarc-
tion and underwent thrombolysis, followed by 
24 hours of induced therapeutic hypothermia, a 
treatment intended to reduce the risk of brain injury 
after cardiac arrest. Unfortunately, Kathy sustained 
severe anoxic brain injury and remained comatose 
after restoration of normal body temperature.
Additional tests were done to help determine her 
neurological prognosis. These tests showed mixed 
results. On the one hand, an MRI scan showed no 
structural abnormality, and somatosensory evoked 
potentials were bilaterally present with normal 
latency and amplitude. While the bilateral absence 
of the N20 somatosensory evoked potentials response 
indicates a poor prognosis,1 its presence does not 
predict neurological outcome. On the other hand, 
Kathy displayed persistent seizure activity on her 
electroencephalogram, which is associated with 
increased mortality following cardiac arrest.2 3
The neurocritical care team met with Kathy’s 
husband and son and explained that they were 
uncertain about her likely outcome and needed more 
time and information to develop a clearer picture 
of Kathy’s prognosis. The care team was aware of 
an ongoing research study at the hospital involving 
functional MRI for which Kathy was eligible. The 
study involved recording brain responses to stimuli 
and comparing patient responses with eventual 
outcome to determine if functional MRI could be a 
useful prognostic test for future patients. Functional 
MRI shows promise as a candidate prognostication 
method in patients with acute brain injury.4–6
There are ethical issues associated with enrolling 
patients like Kathy in functional MRI studies in the 
intensive care unit. In particular, given that Kathy 
herself cannot provide informed consent, how 
should patient autonomy be protected and consent 
be obtained? Are there potential obstacles to proxy 
decision making in this context? Our ethical anal-
ysis stems from reflection on a research study that is 
currently under way at the Lawson Health Research 
Institute. Written informed consent was obtained 
from proxy decision makers in all cases. In this 
article, we identify four ethical issues associated 
with obtaining informed consent in Kathy’s case. 
After describing each issue, we propose potential 
solutions which would make Kathy’s participation 
in the functional MRI study compatible with her 
rights and interests.
sTrATegies fOr infOrmed COnsenT in The 
inTensive CAre uniT
The problem
Informed consent is an important ethical protection 
barring involuntary participation in clinical research, 
but comatose patients like Kathy are unconscious, 
mechanically ventilated and often medically unstable. 
Consequently, they cannot provide informed consent 
to participate in clinical research. When a patient is 
incapable of providing informed consent, a proxy deci-
sion maker is appointed to act on the patient’s behalf 
and assumes the authority to act as a substitute for the 
patient with respect to decision making. In many juris-
dictions, the law indicates who is the proxy decision 
maker for an incapable patient (e.g., Ontario Health 
Care Consent Act, 1996, §20), and proxy decision 
makers are typically spouses or other close family 
members.
The practice of proxy decision making has 
received criticism, particularly in the context of 
research in the intensive care unit.7 8 For example, 
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Burns and colleagues argue that traditional proxy consent 
impedes the recruitment of participants and thus slows scien-
tific progress. In the interest of expediting patient enrolment 
in research, Burns and colleagues suggest two alternatives to 
obtaining proxy consent:
1. The consent requirement is waived altogether.
2. An emergency exception to the informed consent require-
ment is sought.
Proposed solutions
We argue that the two alternatives put forth by Burns and 
colleagues do not sufficiently protect patient autonomy in this 
case and are therefore not suitable for functional MRI research 
in the intensive care unit. Traditional proxy consent is the only 
ethically appropriate strategy in this case. Consider the first 
proposed alternative: waiving consent completely. According 
to Canadian regulation, a waiver of consent is not acceptable 
in studies involving more than minimal risk (Tri-Council Policy 
Statement Article 3.7A). Minimal risk is defined as the risks 
of daily life and is widely understood to subsume the risks of 
a blood draw, routine physician examination and filling out a 
questionnaire, all benign procedures. This provision is based, in 
our view correctly, on the ethical consideration that it would be 
immoral to expose a human being to more than minimal risk 
without her consent because doing so would wrongly disregard 
the respect that is owed to her autonomy.
In order to evaluate the present case, we must consider that 
functional MRI research on acute comatose patients poses 
greater than minimal risks in that it requires transport to the 
MRI scanner room as well as spending time in the MRI scanner. 
Research suggests that intrahospital transport of patients from 
the intensive care unit results in a serious adverse event in 4.2%-
8.9% of cases and cardiac arrest in 0.34%-1.6% of cases.9 Time 
spent in the scanner is a risk because the patient is outside the 
relative safety of the intensive care unit. If the patient experiences 
a medical event (eg, a drop in blood pressure or an increase in 
intracranial pressure) outside the intensive care unit, the poten-
tial for a negative outcome is increased. If study participation 
exposes patients to more than minimal risk, a waiver of consent 
is not ethically acceptable. Even if study participation did not 
expose patients to more than minimal risk, a waiver of consent 
could be granted only if a prior consent requirement made it 
impossible or extremely difficult to carry out the study. In the 
absence of strong feasibility considerations, there would be no 
cogent ethical reason to deprive the patient of the informed 
consent protection. Indeed, Tri-Council Policy Statement Article 
3.7A grants these waivers, in our view correctly, only if prior 
consent makes the study impossible or impracticable. But this 
condition is not satisfied for proxy consent in functional MRI 
research, as it is practicable to run the study after valid proxy 
consent has been obtained. As a result, a waiver of consent 
would not be morally acceptable even if the participants were 
exposed to risk not exceeding the minimal risk standard.
Consider the second proposed alternative: granting an emer-
gency exception to consent. The purpose of an emergency 
exception to consent is to allow research in situations in which a 
potential research participant requires urgent medical care and is 
unable to consent for herself, and the delay involved in locating 
a proxy decision maker could pose a serious risk to the partic-
ipant’s health. Absent an immediate danger to the prospective 
participant or when the research intervention has no therapeutic 
effects, an emergency exception does not apply because it would 
needlessly remove the informed consent protection to which 
participants are normally entitled. Indeed, Tri-Council Policy 
Statement Article 3.8 rightly specifies that an emergency excep-
tion can be granted only if ‘a serious threat to the prospective 
participant requires immediate intervention’ and the research 
‘addresses the emergency needs of the individuals involved’.10
Although patients like Kathy are in critical condition and are 
often medically unstable, functional MRI does not constitute a 
response to an urgent medical need and is not an instance of 
emergency research. The study does not include any life-saving 
interventions, and the delay associated with locating a proxy 
decision maker does not pose a health risk to patients. In fact, 
functional MRI in the proposed research is a non-therapeutic 
research intervention; it does not offer a realistic probability of 
direct benefit to the participant.11 The benefits of the study lie 
in the production of generalisable knowledge, which may help 
future patients, but not Kathy herself. As the conditions for an 
emergency exception do not obtain, functional MRI research on 
acute comatose patients must rely on traditional proxy consent.
ObsTACles TO PrOxy deCisiOn mAking in The inTensive 
CAre uniT COnTexT
The problem
The intensive care unit is a challenging environment for clin-
ical research and creates obstacles to obtaining informed consent 
from proxy decision makers. Complicating factors, including 
stress12 and misunderstandings about the purpose of the 
research,13 can impede the decision-making process for proxy 
decision makers and thereby weaken informed consent protec-
tions. For example, Iverson and colleagues studied family 
members of patients currently in the intensive care unit and 
used a focus group to discuss their perspectives on participation 
in clinical research.14 The authors found that family members 
perceived their experience in the hospital as stressful and over-
whelming. Specifically, anxiety and stress were mentioned as 
reasons not to enrol patients in proposed research studies. Three 
main sources of stress were identified:
1. Observing the patient in a critically ill state.
2. Uncertainty about the patient’s clinical outcome.
3. Contemplating whether the patient’s views were being accu-
rately reflected by the proxy decision maker.
Proposed solutions
Given these potential obstacles to proxy decision making, what 
strategies might researchers employ to enable proxy consent 
in the intensive care unit and ensure that patient autonomy is 
respected? One way to promote proxy consent is to approach a 
patient’s family about participation in a research study at a time 
when stress is minimal, and they are mentally and emotionally 
prepared to consider this option. The insights of the patient’s 
nurse as well as her intensive care unit physicians are particularly 
useful, as they will have had the most contact with the patient’s 
family. Thus, the patient’s immediate healthcare providers are in 
a good position to inform judgments about whether and when 
families should be approached for research participation. If a 
proxy decision maker is not in a condition to discuss partici-
pation in research, she should not be contacted by the research 
team at that time. In some cases, a social worker may provide 
useful additional insights.
In addition to deciding when to approach the patient’s family, 
it is also important to consider who will approach them. When 
the treating physician is also the researcher, an approach by the 
physician may create the impression of conflict of interest and 
even undermine trust between the physician and the family. 
Worse, families may feel pressured to enrol their family member, 
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or may believe that the physician merely wants to use her as 
a means to achieving a research goal. To avoid these potential 
pitfalls, we argue that the idea of research participation ought to 
be first discussed with the patient’s healthcare providers. If there 
is agreement that the family is in a sufficiently robust emotional 
state, the family ought to be approached by a third party, in our 
case a highly trained research coordinator. The research coor-
dinator will explain the study to the family and will seek their 
proxy consent for participation. In this conversation, the research 
coordinator will explain the study’s purpose, procedures, bene-
fits (if any), risks, alternatives, the right to refuse participation 
and to whom questions may be addressed. Adequate time should 
be set aside for this interaction, so the family does not feel 
rushed. Using a research coordinator maintains a clear distinc-
tion between the clinical care of the patient and participation 
in research, thereby making it easier for the family to protect 
patient autonomy in this challenging environment.
The TherAPeuTiC misCOnCePTiOn
The problem
The risk of ‘therapeutic misconception’ poses a further obstacle 
to the exercise of informed consent rights in functional MRI 
research in the intensive care unit.15 Appelbaum and colleagues 
define the therapeutic misconception as the belief that ‘every 
aspect of the research project to which [the patient] had 
consented was designed to benefit him directly’ (p20).15 Under a 
therapeutic misconception, patients and proxy decision makers 
fail to understand that participation in a research study is 
different from routine medical care.
There is some debate regarding the degree to which thera-
peutic misconception undermines the validity of informed 
consent and weakens patient autonomy. It has been argued that 
because consent under therapeutic misconception is uninformed, 
it is not valid; the person consenting lacks understanding and, 
as such, cannot provide valid consent.16 Conversely, others 
have argued that a patient or proxy decision maker may retain 
sufficient autonomy to give informed consent even when ther-
apeutic misconception leads to incomplete understanding, and 
so we should continue to presume autonomy, absent compel-
ling evidence of serious misunderstanding.17 Legitimate ethical 
reasons back both of these standpoints: the former prioritises 
patient protection, whereas the latter endeavours to strike a 
balance between respect for patient autonomy and the beneficial 
social effects of clinical research.
In our view, the key issue is not, however, whether thera-
peutic misconception makes consent invalid, but rather whether 
it causes participants to misconstrue the benefits and risks of 
research participation. If a patient (mistakenly) thinks that she 
stands to benefit directly from what is actually a non-therapeutic 
procedure, this may cause her to make a decision that she would 
not have made if she had understood the facts correctly. In the 
case at hand, Kathy’s family could interpret the non-therapeutic 
functional MRI scan as a therapeutic procedure which may 
provide a direct benefit to her, or as a diagnostic procedure that 
is required by Kathy’s medical condition. Both beliefs would 
instantiate the therapeutic misconception and could lead Kathy’s 
family to accept a higher level of risk than they might otherwise. 
There is no empirical evidence regarding the degree or nature 
of therapeutic misconception in studies using functional MRI 
on comatose patients, and we believe further study is indicated. 
There are indirect lines of evidence that suggest that some family 
members will have unreasonable expectations about the effects 
of the study on the patient’s clinical care. First, the public has 
faith in technology—particularly sophisticated technology like 
functional MRI—and expects to benefit from contact with it. 
Neuroscientific explanations are common and are viewed as 
compelling,18 and functional MRI images are often rated as 
particularly credible pieces of evidence.19 This optimism could 
prevent Kathy’s family from understanding the limitations of the 
technique and bias them towards a ‘therapeutic interpretation’ 
of the functional MRI study. Second, the media, universities 
and research funding agencies have generated hype about func-
tional MRI.20 This hype reinforces the perception of functional 
MRI mentioned above and may lead to an overestimation of the 
potential impact of such technologies on patient care.21
Proposed solutions
Two strategies are available to address therapeutic miscon-
ception. First, researchers should ensure that consent mate-
rials clearly and accurately describe functional MRI as either 
a therapeutic procedure or a non-therapeutic procedure. This 
will depend on the specifics of the study protocol. If there is a 
reasonable prospect of clinical benefit to the patient, it should be 
described in cautious, evidence-based language.11
Second, research staff should spend more time with family 
members discussing study participation. One-on-one conver-
sations are an effective means of improving the understanding 
of consent materials and the retention of information by 
research participants.22 23 Additionally, there is some evidence 
that enhanced consent forms—consent forms that are shorter 
and written using simpler language than standard forms—are a 
useful means of improving participant understanding.22 23 In fact, 
Nishimura and colleagues found that both multimedia interven-
tions and enhanced forms improved information retention over 
time.23 Given these results, the use of enhanced consent forms 
could also be considered.
Timing And differenTiAl levels Of risk
The problem
Consent for functional MRI research must be obtained from 
patients in the intensive care unit in a timely manner. The ideal 
candidate for these studies is a patient with acute brain injury 
that is comatose, unsedated and capable of remaining still in the 
MRI scanner. Finding participants that satisfy these conditions 
is difficult because the likelihood that a patient will satisfy them 
decreases over time. Moreover, MRI scanner time is limited, as 
both clinical and research demand are high.
As discussed above, research involving functional MRI 
amongst patients with acute brain injury requires intrahospital 
transport, and the accompanying risk to patients resulting from 
this transport exceeds minimal risk.9 Accordingly, it is preferable 
to perform the research functional MRI scan at the same time as 
a clinically indicated structural MRI scan.
Pairing a research scan with a clinically indicated scan reduces 
the overall risk to the patient. First, it reduces the number of 
total transports and thus the total risk to which patients are 
exposed. Second, it makes the transport part of a clinically indi-
cated procedure, meaning the transport-related risk is no longer 
a research risk, but a clinical risk. As mentioned above, time 
spent in the scanner is also a source of risk. In the case of paired 
scans, only the duration of the research scan would count as a 
research risk; the time spent in the scanner for the purposes of 
a clinical scan would be a clinical risk. In these cases, the incre-
mental risk posed to patients in functional MRI research may 
drop below the minimal risk standard.
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In spite of the advantages of pairing MRI scans, doing so further 
exacerbates time management problems because it requires two 
slots in a row (which are not always available), and thus can be 
arranged only if tight time constraints are respected. These time 
constraints can hinder the family’s decision-making process and 
further complicate the obtainment of  informed consent in the 
intensive care unit setting. For example, the research team could 
learn that a clinically indicated scan has been ordered with only 
a short time to talk to the patient’s family about the study. In 
this case, informed consent might be rushed, and proxy deci-
sion makers may not have enough time to fully understand the 
information provided. In fact, Barrett and colleagues showed 
that proxy decision makers were less comfortable with being 
involved in clinical research decisions if the enrolment window 
was short,24 while Burns and colleagues showed that expired 
time windows were one of the main reasons why opportunities 
to recruit patients in the intensive care unit setting were missed.8
The potentially brief amount of time a proxy decision maker 
has to deliberate can also impact the level of risk associated 
with participation in these studies; proxy decision makers that 
consent at different points in time may be consenting to different 
levels of risk (all other factors, such as the patient’s haemody-
namic stability, being equal). For example, if a proxy decision 
maker consents soon enough to make ‘pairing’ possible, the 
associated research risk is simply the additional time spent in the 
scanner. In this case, transport to and from the scanner is a clin-
ical risk and not a research risk. Conversely, if the proxy decision 
maker consents when it is no longer possible to pair the research 
scan with a clinical scan, an additional transport to and from 
the scanner is required, thereby increasing the research-related 
risk of participation. Accordingly, the proxy decision maker has 
a rational incentive to make a decision about participation early. 
However, this incentive could compel proxy decision makers 
to give consent to participation before they have given it due 
consideration.
Proposed solutions
MRI scanner time is a scarce resource required by both clinicians 
and researchers. Since paired scans reduce the research risk to 
which patients are exposed, they ought to be conducted when-
ever possible. If research staff approached families regarding 
research participation without undue delay, ‘paired’ scans would 
not result in a slower pace of research or in a suboptimal deci-
sion-making process for family members. Time constraints could 
be partially eased by increasing the availability of research staff. 
Another strategy would be to increase the amount of MRI slots 
that are available to researchers relative to clinical scans.
If ‘paired’ scans and independent scans are both conducted 
in a given study, it is critical that the difference in risk between 
the two kinds of scans be clearly explained to proxy deci-
sion makers. The challenge for the research team here is not 
to rush the proxy decision maker while conveying the relevant 
information. Furthermore, two consent forms (one for the 
‘paired’ scan and one for the independent scan) with different 
sections on risk are required. If the functional MRI scan is not 
paired, the consent document should include a description of the 
risks associated with transport to the scanner room. If the struc-
tural and functional MRI scans are paired, the research consent 
document may omit reference to the risks of transportation. In 
this way, proxy decision makers can correctly understand the 
research risk the patient would be exposed to.
Finally, telephone consent may be a useful tool in addressing 
time constraints. A member of the research team could contact 
the proxy decision maker by telephone and verbally convey the 
relevant information regarding study participation, including the 
study purpose, procedures, benefits, harms and alternatives. The 
Research Ethics Board of the Lawson Health Research Institute 
currently authorises this practice in intensive care settings in 
which the proxy decision maker is not physically present and 
study procedures are subject to strict time constraints. The full 
letter of information must be presented through an approved 
telephone script. Written consent must be obtained within 
24 hours of the telephone consent. If the proxy decision maker 
agrees to participation by phone but does not sign the informed 
consent form within 24 hours, the patient is withdrawn from the 
study. Telephone consent poses challenges to researchers: they 
must ensure that information is adequately understood and that 
respect for patient autonomy is not compromised.
COnClusiOn
Functional MRI research pits respect for patient autonomy 
against the social benefits of clinical research. We make recom-
mendations that balance these important goods. As the patient is 
unconscious in our research, the proxy decision maker is tasked 
with protecting patient autonomy: she must choose—while 
taking the patient’s values and interests into account—whether 
the patient will be enrolled in the study. First, we argued that 
the proxy decision maker cannot be dispensed with, because 
both a waiver of consent and an emergency exception would 
not be ethically sound in this case. Second, we examined three 
potential problems for proxy decision makers: they must make 
an important choice in the challenging environment of the inten-
sive care unit, could fall prey to therapeutic misconception, and 
face complicated issues of timing. To address these issues, we 
proposed solutions that, we contend, allow functional MRI 
research on comatose patients without impinging on any morally 
significant interests.
bACk TO The CAse
The care team brought up the study during one of their meet-
ings with Kathy’s family and explained its rationale and proce-
dures. A researcher was introduced to the family, and after an 
in-depth discussion of the study Kathy’s proxy decision maker 
gave written informed consent. A clinically indicated struc-
tural MRI and a functional MRI were performed in a paired 
manner 11 days post-injury. The functional MRI showed that 
Kathy had preserved functionality in networks associated with 
sound perception, speech perception and language comprehen-
sion.25 However, Kathy could not perform mental imagery tasks, 
that is, volitional tasks in which the patient imagines carrying out 
a motor action such as playing tennis.25 At the time of imaging, 
Kathy remained comatose and dependent on a mechanical 
ventilator. Neurological examination indicated that she could 
withdraw her lower extremities from painful peripheral stimuli 
and spontaneously open her eyes, but that she could not fixate, 
track, blink or close her eyes on command. Three days after the 
functional MRI (day 14), Kathy’s neurological status started to 
gradually improve. A month after her injury, her family reported 
that her usual personality had returned. Kathy was discharged 
40 days after admission fully alert, oriented and asking appro-
priate questions. At the 6-month follow-up, she had resumed her 
normal activities prior to admission.
Contributor TB and CW conceptualized the paper. TB wrote the first draft of the 
paper, and MG and CW edited and rewrote sections of the next draft of the paper. 
All other team members provided comments on subsequent drafts of the paper. All 
authors approved the final paper. 
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